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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COLONIAL LEASING COMPANY OF NEW 
ENGLAND, INC., a Massachusetts 
corporation, d/b/a COLONIAL-
PACIFIC LEASING CO., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL RAY LARSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 19383 
Plaintiff's action is for the aggregate of items (unpaid 
rentals, sales tax, late charges, residual value and sales tax 
thereon, costs and personal property tax, costs of court and attorney 
fees) due under an equipment lease, less sale proceeds after reposs-
ession. Defendant by his answer contended the lease was intended as 
security and subject to the provisions of the UCC's Article 9, and 
that plaintiff's failure to comply with the Article 9 requirements 
as to disposition of repossessed collateral precludes plaintiff from 
recovery in this action. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted plaintiff's motion fr.r summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the lower court's summary Judgment. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
On September 23, 1977, defendant obtained a crawler-loader 
(equipment) from plaintiff on a 60-month lease. The equipment 
was purchased by plaintiff from a supplier specifically for 
defendant (R-5-8). Defendant defaulted and the equipment was 
repossessed and eventually sold 
proceeds of sale to be $3300.00 
(the complaint states the net 
[R 3]; Tal Kennedy's affidavit 
[R 23] states the sale proceeds to be $6000.00). 
The lease (R-5-8), after identifying the equipment, states 
the amount of each monthly payment, including sales tax, to be 
$817.82 for "rental", and $40.89 per month for "use tax", that 
payments are to be made "monthly", that the initial term of the 
lease is "5 years", that the number of payments is "60", that 
the security deposit is "none", and that the renewal rental 
"after the initial term" is "none, payable annually in advance." 
The lease is silent as to an option. However, at the time 
of the transaction there was a verbal agreement between plaintiff 
and defendant that defendant had an option to purchase the 
equipment at the end of the lease for its "residual value" of 
$3386.45 and sales tax, and custom and usage dictated such an 
arrangement (R 53-54A, 561. In September 1982 the market value 
of the equipment was $16,500 (R-54). 
The lease-end responsibility of defendant is to "return 
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the equipment in good repair, ordinary wear and tear resulting 
from proper use thereof alone expected [sic], by delivering it, 
packed and ready for shipment, to such place or carrier as 
lessor [plaintiff] may specify." Under the renewal provisions 
of paragraph 9 of the lease, after the initial term of five 
years, the lease is automatically renewed each year for a term 
of one year, for no rent, and otherwise upon the terms and 
conditions of the lease, unless defendant gives plaintiff written 
notice of cancellation at least thirty days before the expiration 
of the preceding term. 
Under the lease, defendant is required to make all necessary 
repairs to the equipment, and to bear the entire risk of loss, 
theft, damage or destruction of the equipment from any cause 
whatsoever; and defendant is to pay all taxes, maintenance, 
insurance and other costs relating to the equipment, and pro-
vides an agreement for defendant to indemnify plaintiff and hold 
plaintiff harmless from any claims arising from the use of the 
equipment, and to give defendant the benefit of the supplier's 
warranties. It further provides that plaintiff made no represent-
ations or warranties with respect to the equipment, and was not 
liable to the defendant for any damage due to delays in delivery 
or installation of the equipment, and plaintiff did not select 
or inspect the equipment. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate the relation 
between rental charges and depreciation, obsolescence or that 
the rentals were normal or that the defendant was not acquiring 
-3-
an equity in the equipment. 
A disputed issue of fact exists concerning thP corrPct 
balance which is due under the lease (R-23, 57). 
Defendant's discovery of relevant information (R-63-66) was 
cut short by the lower court's entry of summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
The true lease versus security interest was improperly 
resolved by the lower court. 
On a motion for summary judgment the issues are defined by 
the pleadings. Security Pacific Nat. Bank V. Adamo, 191 Cal 
Rptr 134 (CalApp,1983). Plaintiff's complaint averred a true 
lease whereas defendant's answer contended the lease was a 
purchase agreement. The contention precipitates a genuine issue 
of fact which would preclude the granting of a summary judgment. 
Boise Cascade Corporation v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655 
P 2d 668 (Utah, 1982). The trial court was required to resolve 
the disputed fact of true lease versus security interest and 
by its grant of summary judgment impliedly found that the agree-
ment and transaction forming the basis of this lawsuit was a 
lease that did not create a security interest subject to the 
provisions of UCC's Article 9. The resolution of the issue 
suggests that a genuine issue exists. 
The broad scope of UCC's Article 9 is stated in Section 
70A-9-102, U.C.A., 1953, "Except as otherwise provided * * * 
this chapter applies to (a) any transaction (regardless of its 
form)which is intended to create a security interest in 
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personal property." Therefore, if a transaction in the form of 
a lease is actually intended to be a sale, reserving to the 
"lessor" a security interest, it falls under the ambit of Article 
9. FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P 2d 803 (Utah,1979). 
Section 70A-l-201(37), U.C.A., 1953, as amended, provides in 
relevant part, "Whether a lease is intended as security is to be 
determined by the facts of each case; however (a) the inclusion 
of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one 
intended as security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance 
with the terms of the lease, the lessee shall become or has the 
option to become the owner of the property for no additional 
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease 
one intended for security." 
The lower court apparently was of the opinion the assertion 
by defendant of an oral option, and the existence of an option 
based on custom and usage, posed inadmissible evidence because 
of the parol evidence rule and therefore could not be considered 
in connection with the factual determination as to whether the 
transaction between plaintiff and defendant is a true lease or 
one intended as security. 
An assertion that a custom and usage exists does not involve 
an opinion and is theefore admissible. 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence, 
Section or Paragraph 1954 (Chadburn rev. ed. 1972); DiMarzo v. 
American Mut. Ins. Co., 449 NE 2d 1189 (Mass. ,1983). 
The lease is completely silent with respect to the option 
and therefore the parol evidence rules does not preclude evidence 
of an oral option because there would be no contradiction of the 
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lease terms. Vol 1972, No. 3, Law Forum, "Equipment Leasing." 
A question remains as to the nominality of the option pr ice; 
but the fact that an option price is not nominal, or that no 
option exists, does not foreclose construing a purported lease as 
a purchase agreement. Western Enterprises v. Arctic Off ice 
Mach., 667 P 2d 1232 (Alaska,1983). 
On plaintiff's motion for summary Judgment it had the 
burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P 2d 555 (Utah,1983). The lease provis-
ions themselves, as well as the existence of an option and its 
nominality, are apposite in making the determination of true 
lease versus purchase agreement. 76 ALR 3rd l; Ford Motor 
Credit Company v. Dowdy, 284 SE 2d 679 (Ga.App.,1981). 
CONCLUSION 
Questions of fact remain for trial as to whether the 
intention of the parties was the creation of a true lease or 
security for sale of the equipment; and, if a security instru-
ment, whether the disposition by plaintiff was commercially 
reasonable. 
RESP~CTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
' ( C 'lr l ) ( ,-!; ~1~ L 
ROYAL K. HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
On November 21, 1983, two copies of this Appellant's Brief 
were mailed first-class, postage pre-paid, in a sealed envelo~e, 
to L. Edward Robbins, attorney for plaintiff-respondent, at his 
last known address as follows: 1657 East 9400 South, Sandy, Utah 
84092. 
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